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Abstract: Most studies in usable security research aim at a quantification of persons,
who – depending on the subject – fall for phishing, pass on their password, download
malicious software and so on. In contrast, little research is done to identify the reasons
for such insecure behavior. Within this paper, the result of a laboratory study is pre-
sented in which participants were confronted with different certificate warnings. Those
warnings were presented when the participants tried to access different websites with
different criticality (online banking, online shopping, social networks and information
sites). Besides quantitative analyses of participants who were willing to use a websites
despite the warning, the main focus of this work is to identify reasons for their deci-
sion. As a result of our study those risks are identified which were unacceptable for
most participants to take and thereby might help to prevent unsecure usage behavior
in the web by rewording warnings according to the perceived risks.
1 Introduction
Many studies in the context of usable security show that users fail to distinguish trust-
worthy from non-trustworthy websites [DTH06, TJ07, DHC06, JTS+07]. Consequently,
they download viruses, provide personal information to dangerous web services, and fall
for phishing. One reason identified in these studies is that many people are not aware of
security indicators relevant to identify non-trustworthy websites like proper URL and a
communication secured by SSL, ideally based on extended validation certificates. These
studies also show that people care more about the content of the webpage like the logo
and the quality of the web design than about security indicators. Correspondingly, there is
only a small overlapping between people’s trust indicators and real security indicators.
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As this situation is well known, browsers started supporting people in identifying untrust-
worthy websites, by displaying warnings, e.g., special phishing warnings and certification
warnings. This is a first progress as the analysis is done automatically and the user is not
in charge of it. However, studies [DTH06, ECH08, JSTB07, SDOF07, SEA+09] showed
that people do not understand the content of certification warnings and thus tend to ignore
them. Understanding certification warnings is particularly difficult, because trustworthy
(in general less security critical) websites also cause ”invalid” certificate warnings (which
are, e.g., caused by self-signed or expired certificates or the fact that the root certification
authority is not known to the browser). These warnings can be ignored without any serious
risk. Research [ECH08, SEA+09] shows that especially people who have often seen cer-
tificate warnings on trustworthy websites, where ignoring the warning did not cause any
problem, tend to ignore these warnings for any website including the untrustworthy ones,
which then cause serious problems like losing money.
Bravo-Lillo et al. [BCDK11] developed a mental model of how people understand and
react to security warnings. Within this paper, they found that there are big differences in the
behavior of expert and novice users. Experts analyze security problems before proceeding,
whereas novice users think of the consequences afterwards. Overall, the authors found
SSL warnings to be the most confusing warnings. This implicates, that in particular SSL
warnings need to be improved. Therefore, we decided to focus on these warnings.
While most existing studies aim at quantifying persons who fall for different attacks, this
work aims at identifying reasons for such insecure behavior. Based on these results, im-
provements mainly regarding rephrasing warnings are deduced to prevent unsecure behav-
ior in the future. We conducted a laboratory study in which participants were confronted
with different certificate browser warnings when trying to access different websites with
different criticality, namely online banking, online shopping, social networks and news
websites. The participants were asked why they ignored the warning or stopped accessing
a corresponding webpage. There was no usability assessment of the warnings. Our main
result from this study is that people ignoring the warning underestimate the risk and are
more likely to stop accessing web pages when warnings describe personal risks. Thus,
based on our results, we recommend using these risk descriptions when rewording (certifi-
cation) warnings, while also distinguishing different criticality classes of web pages in the
text of the warning. This idea goes along the lines with those recommendations proposed
by Wogalter in ([Wog06], page 6) claiming that warning needs to ”tell exactly what the
hazard is, what the consequences are, what to do or not to do”.
This paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2, we’ll discuss related work.
Afterwards, we will describe the methodology of the study in Section 3 and propose the
result of the study in Section 4. Section 5 discusses these results and concludes the paper
with an outlook for future work.
2 Related Work
The aspect of user’s perceived consequences when submitting information to a fraudulent
website has been studied extensively in the context of phishing attacks [JTS+07, ECH08,
SEA+09, DHC07].
One of the most notable contributions in the area of SSL warnings is by Sunshine et al.
[SEA+09]. They conducted an online survey followed by a laboratory study. In the online
survey, they presented three different SSL certificate warnings (unknown issuer, certificate
expired and domain mismatch) within the browser which the participants indicated they
were using at the time. The warnings were displayed on either an anonymous forum or a
shopping website (between-subjects) to 409 participants. Among other things they asked
their participants ”whether they understood what the warnings mean, what they would do
when confronted with each warning and their beliefs about the consequences of ignor-
ing these warnings”. They did not find significant differences between the two websites.
However, they did find that users who associated risks related to stolen information (e.g.
identity theft, stolen credentials) with the warnings were more likely to heed them. To
verify their findings, Sunshine et al. [SEA+09] conducted a laboratory experiment with
100 participants. Each participant completed tasks involving interaction with a library cat-
alog and an online banking website (within-subjects) with one of five browsers: Firefox 2,
Firefox 3, Internet Explorer 7 (IE7) and another two versions of IE7 with modified warn-
ing messages. The first modified warning message was altered visually to appear more
severe and stated ”An attacker is attempting to steal information that you are sending to
[domainname]”. The other modified warning first asked the user what kind of website she
was visiting. In case of banks or web shops, the same warning as in the first modified
version was displayed. In all other cases, the user was directed to the requested website.
In the experiment, significantly fewer participants ignored the redesigned warnings than
the existing warnings on the banking website. Nine out of eleven participants who heeded
the first modified warning mentioned security of their information as the reason for doing
so. No other significant effects of warning design were found.
We aim at replicating these findings in Germany with current browser versions as well
as expanding on them by further investigating the risks associated with SSL warnings
qualitatively.
3 Methodology
The herein presented study was a laboratory test and took place at the Technische Uni-
versita¨t Darmstadt in Germany. The study consisted of two parts. Part one asked general
questions on the participants’ online usage behavior and their knowledge of security in-
dicators. In part two, participants were instructed that they received an email with a link,
which leads them to one out of twelve websites. The mail asked them to log in on the page
and update some of their personal data.
Overall, three independent variables were varied: page type, web browser and warning
displayed. There were four different kinds of websites: online banking sites, online shop-
ping sites, social networks and pure information sites. As in Sunshine et al.’s laboratory
study [SEA+09], we expect users to react differently to warnings on different kinds of
websites. Since Sunshine et al. only found differences in their within-subject study, we
present different kinds of websites to each subject as well. It was expected that the number
of participants who log in on a website and ignore the warning increases with decreasing
criticality of the website.
Type and version of the web browser defines the second independent variable. The design
of the warning varies significantly between different browser types and versions. The
following four different browsers respectively browser versions were used: FireFox 2,
FireFox 4, Internet Explorer 6, and Internet Explorer 9. Those browser types were selected
as they are widely-spread at the time the survey was conducted. The versions were chosen
to compare current with outdated warning design. Last, the type of certificate warning was
varied. Three different certificate warnings were used within this study: certificate expired,
certification authority unknown and wrong domain name. Figure 1-4 show examples for
the warning ”certification authority unknown” for each browser/version.
Figure 1: Certificate warning ”certification authority unknown” for FireFox 4
Each participant was asked to access four different websites of at least three different kinds.
The displayed warnings were in the design of each of the four browser types/versions. The
warning contained each addressed certificate warning at least once. Participants were ran-
domly assigned to the combination of type of website, browser type/version, and content
of warning.
Participants were asked if they would use the website as normally, which included entering
their user name and password to log in. In case of the pure information sites, this would
have meant getting access to forums or customized information. Additionally, they were
asked to give reasons for their decision. In a second step, each participant was confronted
Figure 2: Certificate warning ”certification authority unknown” for Internet Explorer 9
Figure 3: Certificate warning ”certification authority unknown” for FireFox 2
with each of these four combinations again and had to answer two questions for each of
them, namely ”What does the warning mean?” and ”Which risk comes along with this
warning?”.
4 Results
The results are a combination of quantitative and qualitative data. All calculations on the
quantitative data were done with SPSS 19. Qualitative data was quantified by grouping
similar answers to be able to somehow quantify the prevalence of the different answers.
Figure 4: Certificate warning ”certification authority unknown” for Internet Explorer 6
4.1 Participants
30 participants attended the laboratory study. 14 participants were female. The participants
were aged between 16 and 68 years, with an average of 35.50 years (SD = 15.94). One
third of the participants stated to use the internet several times a day, 56.7% daily and
only three participants stated to use it between once and four times a week. None of the
participants stated not to use the internet at all. Participants were asked about their online
shopping behavior. One participant responded to buy weekly at shops like Amazon, 90%
of the participants ordered less than once a week and two participants stated that they never
use online-shopping.
Out of the 30 participants 26.7% stated not to use online banking at all. One third of the
participants are not active in social networks whereas 16.7% use social networks several
times a day. 26.7% participants use social networks at least once a day, 13.3% three to four
times a week and 3.3% once a week. 6.7% stated to use social networks less than once a
week. 60% of the participants used Firefox as internet browser, 23.3% used the Internet
Explorer. 6.7% used other browsers and 10% did not respond to the question.
The number of 30 participants was chosen because the main focus of this study lies on
the qualitative analysis of the perceived risk. According to Morgan et al. [MFBA01] this
sample size is large enough to be likely to reveal at least once any belief held by 10 percent
or more of the population.
4.2 Quantitative Reactions to Certificate Warnings
The aim of this section is to quantify the number of people who decided to log in on
a website despite the warning. The number of logins is distinguished between browser
type/version (cmp. Table 1), content of warning (cmp. Table 2), and type of website (cmp.
Table 3).
Browser Type/Version Would you log in?
Yes No
FireFox 2 10 20
FireFox 4 8 22
Internet Explorer 6 11 9
Internet Explorer 9 9 21
Table 1: Number of participants who decided to log in according to the browser type/version.
Warning Type Would you log in?
Yes No
wrong domain name 11 29
certificate expired 13 27
unknown authentication authority 14 26
Table 2: Number of participants who decided to log in according to the warning type.
Kind of Website Would you log in?
Yes No
online banking 2 28
online shoping 8 20
social network 13 19
information site 15 15
Table 3: Number of participants who decided to log in according to type of website.
With the help of cross tables a χ2 statistic was computed to test if there is an effect of the
browser type/version, the content of the warning, and the type of website respectively on
the number of participants who would log in on the page despite the warning. The test
revealed no significant difference between different browser types/versions (χ = 0.770, df
= 3, p = .857). The same holds for the content of the warning (χ = 0.539, df = 2, p =
.764). The last independent variable was the type of website on which the certificate warn-
ing occurred. Here a χ2 test revealed highly significant differences between the different
website types (χ = 14.636, df = 3, p = .002). Table 3 shows that the number of people
who are willing to log in on a certain website despite an occurring warning decreases with
increasing criticality of the deposed data.
4.3 Qualitative Reactions to Certificate Warnings
Within this study qualitative data was collected which is evaluated in this subsection.
Reasons for and against logging in. Besides the decision whether to log in or not on
a certain page with a warning, participants were asked to give reasons for their decision.
With 30 participants and four pages per participant an overall of 120 reasons were given.
Similar reasons were grouped. This led to an overall of 10 different groups of reasons
for log in and 13 different groups of reasons against log in. Five reasons are present in
both groups, due to the fact that some people decided to log in because of those reasons,
whereas other participants decided against logging in. Table 4 gives an overview of the
reasons combined with the number of participants giving that reason.
a) Reasons for log in Number
trust in this website 15
no personal data existent 6
risk unknown/unclear 6
interested in content/usage of page 3
illusion of inviolability
(I am sure nothing will happen/Nothing never happened before) 2
warning incomprehensible 2
website looks secure 1
certificate unknown/invalid 1
coping strategies (close site and open again; try again later) 1
general caution 1
b) Reasons against log in Number
general caution 31
personal data existent 10
attacks feared 10
high risk for banking/websites 7
faked website 6
warning incomprehensible 5
page is insecure 4
coping strategies (close site and open again; try again later) 4
warning exists 1
design of warning 1
problems with the content of the page 1
certificate unknown/invalid 1
risk unknown/unclear 1
Table 4: Number of participants who decided to log in on a website despite the warning (a) or not to
log in on a website (b) separated according to the reason for their decision.
The reason ”trust in this website” which led in majority to a visit of a website despite
showing a warning was further investigated and divided according to the website for which
this reason was mentioned. Trust was used as reason to log in on banking sites (one
participant), on shopping sites (three participants), in social networks (five participants)
and on information sites (six participants) despite the warnings.
Associated Risk. The second part of the qualitative analysis was concerned with the
question which risk participants associate with ignoring the warnings. Each participant
had to name the risk he would take if he ignored the warning for each warning he was
presented. That made a total 120 named risks. Again, risks were grouped to simplify the
evaluation.
A total of eight different risk groups emerged. Those groups and the according number
of mentions are shown in Table 5. The higher a risk is represented in the table, the more
participants in total mentioned the risk.
Risk Number Log in?
Yes No
spying out personal data 58 11 47
risk unknown 22 7 15
manipulation of website/connection/own PC
due to insecure connection 15 8 7
no risk 14 9 5
malware 7 2 5
loss of money 3 1 2
website not accessible 1 0 1
Table 5: Risks mentioned as being associated with ignoring the warning with number of participants
who would log in despite the risk or not.
Out of all 120 mentions a total of 38 led to a log in on a page with warning. Excluding nine
participants who stated that there is no risk associated with the warning1, 29 participants
remain who decided to log in on a page, despite the fact that they were able to name an
occurring risk. The most often named risk was ”spying out personal data”. Therefore
this risk was further investigated. Four out of the eleven participants who were willing to
log in even by taking the risk of spying out personal data stated that they would take the
risk for accessing an online shopping site, five participants for social networks and two
for information sites. Nobody was willing to take that risk for an online banking site. It
is noteworthy that one participant was willing to log in on an online shopping page even
though he associated a potential loss of money with it.
As a next step, we compared answers which explicitly mentioned a personal risk with
those that did not mention any personal risk (excluding those that saw no risk at all).
The groups ”Spying out personal data” and ”Financial loss” were identified as ”personal
risk”, all other groups except ”no risk” as ”no personal risk”. Then we investigated if
personal risks were more likely to prevent participants from logging in. A χ2 test revealed
significant differences between personal and no personal risk (χ = 4.272, df = 1, p = .039),
with personal risk being more effective in preventing login (see Table 6).
1It is noteworthy that four participants associated no risk even with warnings on the bank website.
Kind of risk Would you log in?
Yes No
personal risk 12 49
no personal risk 17 28
Table 6: Number of participants who decided to log in on the website despite the warning or not,
separated according to whether they associated personal or technical risks with it.
5 Discussion
Some of our findings concur with those by Sunshine et al. [SEA+09], while others do
not. In both studies, risks associated with ignoring SSL warnings played a key role in the
decision to heed the warning or not. However, Sunshine et al. report no statistical tests
for the correlation between risk perceptions and decisions relating to warnings. Consistent
with their laboratory experiment but in contrast to their online survey, we found significant
differences in behavior between the different types of websites. This can be explained by
the fact that both our and their lab experiment tested the website type as a within-subjects
factor whereas it was a between-subjects factor in their survey. Therefore participants were
probably more aware that there are different kinds of websites and their different security
preferences were more salient. Since visiting different types of websites in a row is more
akin to usual web browsing behavior than visiting only one kind, we conclude that this
finding has a higher external validity than the survey finding.
In contrast to Sunshine et al. we found no different reactions to the different kinds of
warnings. This can be explained by our participant’s lack of knowledge about SSL and
related warnings, as Sunshine et al. reported much larger differences between reactions to
the different types of warnings for experts than for non-experts.
21 times, participants gave ”risk unknown or unclear” as answer to the question which
risk is associated with ignoring the warning. Out of these 21 participants six participants
decided to log-in. This is about a quarter of the participants. It can be assumed that those
participants would not have logged in, if they would have been informed on the risks they
were taking. This leads to the conclusion that the risk should be clearly communicated to
the users.
For the communication of the risk, the wording is essential for the success of the warning,
as can be seen in Table 6. Here, nine out of 17 participants who associated the technical
risk ”Manipulation of website/connection/own PC due to insecure connection” with log-
ging in to the website did log in. The communication of the risk should therefore not only
be formulated in terms of technical risks (e.g. the connection is insecure,) but in terms of
personal risks (e.g. therefore, someone might be able to spy out your personal data).
A similar approach is needed for those who enter a website just because of their trust in
the page regardless of warnings (as 15 of our participants did). To inhibit this unsecure
behavior the risks should be clearly named and additionally, it is necessary to communicate
that the look of a page alone is not sufficient to guarantee its trustworthiness.
Furthermore, nine participants were sure that there is no risk associated with the displayed
warnings. Some pointed out that there was no personal data to spy out (on information sites
and social networks), some stated that they are familiar with the warning and until now,
nothing had ever happened. This is partly true, because some of the presented warnings
come along with low risk. Still, even our information sites had a log-in area, in which
additional information was provided. To enter this log-in page a password and a user
name were required. It is alarming that spying out passwords is not perceived as potential
risks by our participants, especially because many people tend to use the same password
for several applications [CVOB06]. Therefore, for a number of participants the theft of a
password in this application would enable or at least simplify attackers the access to other
applications used by the same participant. For this reason, it is essential to inform people
about possible risks.
Within this study, personal risks (namely spying out personal data and financial loss)
were found to be more effective in terms of preventing users from visiting a website de-
spite a warning than impersonal risks, like a generalized manipulation of the communi-
cation or malware or an unknown risk. This is consistent with a study by Hardee et al.
[HWM06] where participants mostly mentioned ”Protecting Information” and ”Protecting
Money/Property” as the gains from making conservative security decisions. Therefore,
”spying out personal data” or ”financial loss” should be mentioned in warning massages
directly. We believe that the effectiveness could even be further increased, if it is possible
to make content-sensitive warnings which indicate the kind of data (e.g. banking data) that
would be spied out on the type of web page that the user tries to access.
6 Conclusion and Outlook
We conducted a study on certificate warnings. A website was shown to the participants
with an according warning. Participants were then asked to either log in or not. After-
wards, they were asked to justify their decision. The study revealed the following four
items: First, the general section on security indicators confirmed that most people are not
familiar with them. Then, the qualitative part of this research revealed that people are often
not aware of actual risks. As a third result, we showed that the perceived risk of personal
data being spied out prevented most participants from entering the corresponding website.
From this result, we conclude that risks need to be more clearly communicated. The fourth
result of the study allows us to further concretize this statement, as we showed that it is
more effective to communicate personal risks than technical risks. Correspondingly, we
can conclude that personal risk descriptions should be used when rephrasing warnings.
These findings confirm and expand upon the major findings by Sunshine et al. [SEA+09].
Building upon our findings we are currently preparing a study that tests newly designed
warnings which incorporate information about the personal consequences of submitting
data to a fraudulent site of a certain kind. We hope that these warnings will be even more
effective than the ones designed by Sunshine et al., which still remained on an impersonal
level (”An attacker is attempting to steal information”).
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